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Abstract: 
 
This article introduces papers in a Symposium that report some of the findings 
 
and arguments to emerge from a collaborative research project involving five 
 
Colombian universities forming the Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de 
 
Derechos de Propiedad Agraria (Observatory of Restitution and Regulation of 
 
Agrarian Property Rights). In a number of ways, the research presented in the 
 
Symposium advances understanding of the political economy of rural Colombia, 
 
and of war in Colombia, and the papers, drawing on the original evidence 
 
collected by Observatorio researchers, develop arguments that have a wider 
 
relevance too for agrarian political economy and the understanding of violent 
 
conflict. In particular, the papers highlight the direct participation of elites in 
 
violent conflict; the varieties and nuances of wartime primitive accumulation; 
 
the complexities of the state's role in wartime agrarian political economy; the 
 
gender dimensions of agrarian conflict; the interaction of war and law; and the 
 
significance for service provision of farm size. As Colombia - hopefully - passes 
 
from long war to peace, these arguments and this evidence may be valuable in 
 
debates about what kind of peace can develop. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the three years leading up to the momentous signing in 2016 of a peace accord 
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between the Colombian government and the FARC (the main insurgent group), 
researchers from the Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de 
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Propiedad Agraria (Observatory of Restitution and Regulation of Agrarian 
Property Rights) collected new evidence on the dynamics of conflict, political 
mobilization, and rural economies in Colombia. This symposium presents some 
of the Observatorio’s results.1 
 
 
The theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the symposium papers 
advance our understanding of the conflict and of rural political economy in 
Colombia in significant ways. The insights gained are not merely of historical 
interest for scholars of a war that may hopefully finally be over. More than this, 
they suggest some of the political, social and economic challenges that citizens 
and politicians will face in post-war Colombia, if the peace is to last and 
especially if it is to be more than a peace serving the interests of a narrow elite. 
They also deepen scholarly understanding of the economic, legal and social 
legacies of war, as well as the challenges and opportunities those legacies pose 
for post-conflict societies. Land issues will be at the core of those challenges. As 
Zetter (2011, 66) put it: the ‘issue of land both permeates and mediates all the “r” 
processes – reconstruction, rebuilding peace, return, reintegration’. Meanwhile, 
the research reported in this symposium has the added benefit of contributing to 
debates on how most appropriately to analyse and understand the political 
economy of armed conflict. The contributions here add nuance to some debates – 
for example, on primitive accumulation and on gender and conflict – while also 
highlighting major gaps in the literature, for instance on the direct participation 
in large-scale violence of elite actors in the licit economy. 
 
1 The Observatorio is a network of researchers from five Colombian universities, with an 
international advisory board. 
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One of the defining features of the Colombian peace process has been that it was 
Colombians who led and designed the process, the format and content of 
negotiations, and the substance of the peace accords, though of course there was 
external assistance (from Cuba and Norway in particular). This may suggest that 
Colombia cannot be a ‘pacified peace’ (Berdal and Suhrke, 2012) where an 
external power imposes its own version of peace, though it would be remiss to 
ignore the disciplining role of external forces, not least ‘the markets’, in shaping 
political incentives. As Peters (2013, 553) notes, some argue that neo-liberal 
globalization has produced the ‘most significant reassertion of the primacy of 
struggles over the global politics of land since the early 1950s’. 
 
 
It remains of course to be seen what form peace will take after the ratification by 
Colombia’s Congress of the Havana Accords. Will it be a ‘Victor’s Peace’, where 
despite a negotiated agreement one ‘side’ will be able to impose its will and 
agenda without restraint on post-war society? That seems pretty much what 
former president Álvaro Uribe sought in leading the successful ‘no’ vote 
challenge to the original version of the peace deal put to a national plebiscite.2 
Will it be a Conflictual Peace, as in Afghanistan, where peace is declared but 
organized armed conflict persists in parts of the country (or in a Colombian 
version ongoing assassinations of social movement and trade union leaders and 
the persistence of violence by the ‘bacrim’, the bandas criminales that sprang up 
in the wake of paramilitary demobilisation)? The research presented here may 
2 ‘No’ supporters proposed 410 modifications to the peace agreement signed in Havana 
between the FARC and President Santos’s negotiating team, ‘many of them poison darts 
aimed at the heart of the negotiations’ (Ruiz, 2016). 
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give some clues at least to some of the interests and dynamics likely to shape the 
peace. 
 
 
It is very clear, for example, that a sizeable and powerful section of the 
Colombian elite had a direct stake in the war. Many cattle ranchers, as Gutiérrez- 
Sanín and Vargas (2017) show, were much more than indirect beneficiaries of 
the massive displacement of people from their land during the war. Rather, they 
actively took part in the war, often leading paramilitary groups. Meanwhile, as 
several of the authors emphasize, there were others who were less directly 
engaged in armed conflict but who took strong advantage of the forced 
displacement of people from land, of the ongoing tensions between different 
state agencies, and of the often obfuscatory character of legal institutions. The 
resulting increase in Colombia’s already very high concentration of land has been 
a key feature of the war and one whose post-war implications will take years to 
unfold. 
 
 
The recent history of post-war land reform and restitution, including notable 
examples such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, does nothing to suggest a rapid, 
equitable process of restitution and land reform in post-war Colombia. In fact, 
restitution has been underway since 2011 in Colombia, and its painfully slow 
progress and legal culs-de-sac are all too familiar to observers of post-apartheid 
South Africa (O’Laughlin et al, 2013; Hall, 2014) and post-war Zimbabwe 
(Rutherford, 2008, 2012). 
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An emphasis on women’s access to land in Colombia’s 2011 restitution law and 
subsequent regulations has been unable to overcome historically entrenched 
gender inequalities in much of Colombian society. In contrast, women have come 
to play a wide variety of roles in the insurgency. While participation in the ranks 
of the FARC was initially highly gendered, the FARC came to put an uncommon 
emphasis on the recruitment of women. Gutiérrez-Sanín and Carranza (2017) 
show that women’s roles in the guerrilla shifted over time, from the provision of 
basic services (cooking, etc.) to taking on new roles including as direct 
combatants. If this recruitment drive and a shift in the gendered division of 
wartime labour was partly a response to the organization’s decision to expand 
rapidly, it nonetheless led to an institutionalisation of new gender norms within 
the FARC. 
 
 
The article reinforces recent literature that emphasizes the agency of women 
during war as well as their victimization. To be sure, women are often victims of 
war, and suffer war and its consequences differently from men: they may be 
targeted much more frequently with sexual violence than with lethal violence, 
for example. (Men too suffer sexual violence but less frequently than women in 
the cases where it has been well documented, with the exception of sexual 
torture for which men are often the most frequently victimized.) And women 
often suffer in specific ways the indirect effects of war as well. Plümper and 
Neumayer (2006) find evidence that war reduces the gender gap in life 
expectancy between women and men, reflecting a large and lasting indirect 
burden of war on women that is higher than for men. But there is also 
increasingly rich evidence (Kriger, 2003; Viterna 2013, Thomas and Bond 2015) 
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that women actively and voluntarily participate in wars. They may do so to 
escape the drudgery and violence of patriarchy in rural areas, because members 
of their family or other social networks joined before them, or out of conviction. 
The article by Gutiérrez-Sanín and Carranza (2017) confirms these patterns but 
adds an analysis of the often-neglected organizational characteristics that led to 
women’s widespread recruitment as combatants. 
 
 
There is of course a long history of war shaking up the gender division of labour, 
with war coming to be regarded from the safe distance of historical hindsight as, 
in gender terms, quite progressive. But there is also a history of peace 
unravelling the gains in gender equality and reversing the at least partial 
liberation of women from traditional restricted social roles (Wood 2008). The 
research findings highlighted here serve notice that there will be a challenge to 
reinforce, spread and apply in non-military contexts the kind of norms, rhetoric 
and practice of greater gender equality that the FARC in wartime embraced. 
 
 
These are examples of the way in which many wars outgrow their original ‘root 
causes’. While these root causes may well continue to influence social relations 
in wartime, the dynamics of armed conflict – especially in societies such as 
Colombia that have sustained such a lengthy war – tend to generate new 
relations, new tensions, new challenges (Woodward, 2007). 
 
 
Indeed, there is an emerging literature on the social legacies of war, the 
transformation of actors, social structures, gender relations and social norms at 
the local level (Wood 2008; Starr and Wood in progress).  Those transformations 
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vary sharply across civil wars. For example, land holdings in El Salvador were 
dramatically fragmented by the state’s counterinsurgency agrarian reform, 
occupation of land by insurgent-allied cooperatives, and market transactions 
driven by remittances from the US and the inability of landlords to work their 
land (Wood 2003). Although social relations in Guatemala changed to some 
extent, there was little change in agrarian property during the years of the war. 
In Peru, the extent to which agrarian social relations were transformed by the 
war is as yet little analysed (but see Soifer and Vergara, forthcoming). 
 
 
In sharp contrast, in Colombia agrarian property rights and patterns of de facto 
land use became more concentrated over the decades of the war.3 To our 
knowledge, Colombia is the only recent conflict in which forcible dispossession 
for the purpose of immediate transfer (in contrast to ‘mere’ forced displacement) 
occurred to such an extent. 
 
 
The evidence from Colombia presented here (see Peña et. al. 2017; also Vargas 
and Uribe, 2017) helps to refine the recently revived idea of primitive 
accumulation. Primitive accumulation and ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
(Harvey, 2009), have been used by a number of political economists and in a 
variety of ways: to cover the wide wingspan of the advancing commercialization 
of social life (Harvey, 2009); to suggest a feature common to developing 
economies but with echoes of the early foundations of capitalism (Khan, 2000); 
and to highlight a common feature of modern war economies (Cramer, 2006; 
 
3 For example, on the increase in rural land concentration and of the Land Gini in 
Colombia between 2000 and 2009 see Ibáñez (2009). 
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Cramer and Richards, 2011), partly to suggest that these wars may have 
dynamics that in time may be more complex than the simplistic World Bank 
(2003) notion of war as ‘development in reverse’. But what is clear from 
Colombia is that primitive accumulation – a concept deep in the historical 
memory of political economy, in Smith’s formulation as original accumulation 
and in Marx – requires greater detail and nuance and comes in varied forms. 
 
 
In the classic formulation, as for example in the enclosure movement in early 
modern England, those who dispossess poor people by privately ‘enclosing’ 
erstwhile common property deprive people of access to the means of production 
and force them either into indigence and dependence on charity or into 
dependence on wage labour. At the same time, the newly accumulated and 
increasingly concentrated land generates surpluses that form the initial capital 
that over time becomes the basis for the self-sustaining logic of capitalist 
expansion: ‘extra-economic’ coercion enables and is in turn and time displaced 
by ‘economic compulsions’. 
 
 
The general idea has been invoked – for Colombia and elsewhere – in fairly 
sweeping terms. In contrast, Peña et al (2017) show that the logic and 
sequencing of extra-economic and economic compulsions can unfold in different 
ways. In parts of Colombia – especially in the north – a pretty direct form of 
primitive accumulation has taken place. But in other areas, there has been a 
more indirect dynamic. Violence itself was not always the direct basis of 
accumulation of land and related assets (including access to state credits). 
Rather, violence intersected with the contradictions of the state (with different 
1
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parts of the state at institutional loggerheads with one another) and inconsistent 
formal, legal ‘rules of the game’ to create opportunities that others (those not 
directly involved in the violence) came to take advantage of, partly based on 
their connections to state authorities. Indeed, some of those who accumulated 
land through this indirect mechanism were deprived of their new assets in the 
land restitution process and have lodged challenges to that process. Drawing on 
judicial rulings in restitution cases, Peña and her co-authors show how the war 
weakened the rights of the rural poor, and strengthened the biased adjudication 
of property rights toward those with personal connections to elites and state 
officials, in part because of the ‘capture’ of key local state agencies by local elites 
and armed actors. 
 
 
Where the beneficiaries of dispossession were not participants in the violence – 
for example in North Santander where, after demobilisation of paramilitary 
groups, large palm oil producers acquired lands that had earlier been drained by 
the paramilitaries – the development policies of the Colombian state drove the 
dynamic of capitalist expansion built on extra-economic compulsion. But as 
Vargas and Uribe (2017) show, the state has not acted as a unitary organization, 
exclusively serving one set of interests. 
 
 
In the same way, ideas about ‘why men rebel’ or more broadly what motivates 
people to participate directly in armed conflicts still need further development. 
Colombia has already provided detailed evidence (Gutierrez-Sanin, 2004) that 
challenges the absurdity of the mainstream ‘economic perspective’ on armed 
conflict, namely the notion that the poor have a comparative advantage in 
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violence and that recruits to violent organizations are people who have 
rationally chosen collective violence exclusively to maximise their individual 
utility where there are direct material rewards to participation. Much of this 
earlier evidence – corroborating evidence from studies elsewhere (including 
Wood, 2003, on El Salvador or Kriger, 2003 on Zimbabwe) – focused on the 
complex motivations for participation in collective armed action. But new 
evidence (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Vargas, 2017) focuses more unusually on elites, 
often thought to stand aloof from violent conflict and perhaps (Grenier, 1996) to 
orchestrate though not to get their hands dirty. Colombian evidence shows – to 
the contrary – that elites do not always shy away from very direct involvement. 
Their violent utility maximisation may shine through, but it is hardly driven by 
poverty and the closure of any other options for survival. Where the standard 
economic model of civil war highlights the key actor of collective violence as a 
young, poor, unemployed male, Gutiérrez-Sanín and Vargas emphasise how 
important in Colombia’s war ‘middle aged, well to do and well connected’ men 
have been, a class of what might be called ‘landed bellocrats’ and particularly in 
this paper a group of cattle ranchers. 
 
 
If some cattle ranching and other elites (including banana growers) participate 
directly in violent conflict then they represent those with ‘passionate interests’ 
(Cramer, 2006) who give the lie to the argument, traced to its historical origins 
by Hirschman (1977), that engaging in commercial interests deflects people from 
more extreme, violent behaviour and to the argument that ‘development retards 
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war’ (World Bank, 2003).4 This evidence also appears to belie the argument 
some have made that large landowners in Colombia act as a democratic check on 
the behaviour of politicians and that they are also associated with the provision 
of public goods and service delivery. 
 
 
Paying closer attention to the Colombian evidence on the relative weight of large, 
small and – significantly – medium size farmers in particular municipalities 
suggests a very different dynamic of service provision, especially in the wake of 
moves towards greater local democracy. Velásquez (2017) introduces the highly 
suggestive results of compositional analysis (going beyond what can be 
misleading implications of Gini coefficients) of municipal level data on 
landholding size. The findings upend some claims held about rural Colombia and 
they do so on the basis of a much-needed step in disaggregating the rural 
population. 
 
 
Velásquez’s article may point to an area needing further research at local levels. 
And it touches – as do other articles in the symposium – on the fundamental 
social and economic challenges of what Ruiz (2016) referred to as a rural society 
that ‘is among the most backward in the world’. Peace is likely to be a fillip to 
new national and international investment in commercial agri-business. Rather 
than a polarized debate simply pitting proponents of large-scale agriculture 
against critics of ‘land grabbing’ and supporters of a small-scale farming, there 
 
 
4 As acknowledged in the Bank (IEG, 2016, ix), ‘the development community’s 
perception of conflict and violence is no longer primarily associated with low-income 
countries’ since the evidence suggests a higher incidence, lately, of violent conflict in 
middle income countries than in low income countries. 
12 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Journal of Agrarian Change Vol. 17 (4) 
October 2017, 733-738. Published version available from: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joac.12239/full  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24894/  
 
 
needs to be more debate including on the consequences for policy, about which 
relatively large-scale agriculture is potentially progressive, generating 
employment (especially of poor rural women) and foreign exchange, while also 
addressing the need to keep a lid on food price inflation, and which forms of 
commercial agriculture are less socially useful. Many might argue that the big 
investment in palm oil referred to in some of the articles here is simply a new 
form of cattle ranching – enclosing huge swathes of land to generate high profits 
without creating meaningful employment (and employment on poor terms). 
These issues will also be especially pressing in areas of the country, typically 
borderlands, where there will need to be some transition away from illicit crop 
production, despite the direct and indirect contribution that coca production, 
processing and trade may have made to local employment. 
 
 
Thus the research highlighted in this symposium - the role of agrarian elites in 
violence but not in the provision of public services, the processes by which land 
concentration occurred, the origins of the FARC’s high proportion of female 
combatants, and the failure of restitution policies to adequately address the 
gendered dynamics of war and patriarchy - contributes to the analysis of the 
many striking challenges that Colombia now faces. Of course there are other 
important legacies of war (Wood 2008) that are not addressed here, including 
widespread displacement, the limited reach of the state into formerly conflicted 
regions, the wartime weakening of fiscal links between rural Colombia and the 
state, the threat of political entrepreneurs emerging who try to hold onto their 
wartime claims to violence rights (Cramer, 2015) and who may hope to trade 
acquiescence to peace for licences or pay-offs in a version of what de Waal 
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(2015) calls a ‘payroll peace’, among others. We hope it is evident that the 
Observatorio’s research also contributes more broadly to ongoing scholarly 
debates on the politics and political economy of war and of agrarian change. 
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